This paper describes new conditions on parameters selection that lead to an efficient algorithm for forging ElGamal digital signature. Our work is inspired by Bleichenbacher's ideas.
Introduction
Numerous digital signature algorithms have been developed since the invention of the public key cryptography in the late 1970s [3, 15, 14] . They almost all have the same principle. Every user possesses two kinds of keys. The first one is private, must be kept secret and stored only locally. The second is public and must be largely diffused to be accessible to the others users. To sign a particular message, a contract or a will M, Alice has to solve a hard mathematical equation depending of M and of her public key. With the help of her private key, she is able to furnish the solutions. Bob, the judge or anybody, can verify that the solutions computed by Alice are valid. For an adversary, without knowing Alice private key, the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it is computationally too hard to solve the considered equation. One of the most popular signature algorithm was proposed by ElGamal [4] . It has many variants [16, 17, 9, 5] and is based on the hard discrete logarithm problem. Since its conception in 1985, several attacks were mounted and have revealed possible weaknesses if the signature keys were not carefully selected [2, 1, 10, 13] . However, no general method for breaking totally the system is known.
In an ElGamal signature protocol, a signer, in addition to his private key, must detain three other integer parameters (p, α, y) as a public key. In 1996, Bleichenbacher [2] presented a cryptanalysis where he showed that if the generator α and the modulus p verify some special relations, it is possible to forge ElGamal signature for any arbitrary message. In particular, he proved that, the signature scheme becomes insecure when parameters α and p are chosen such that α divides p − 1. Hence, selecting α = 2 is imprudent. The purpose of our work, is to describe new conditions on parameters selection that lead to an efficient algorithm for forging ElGamal signature for any arbitrary message. As an extension of Bleichenbacher's result, we show that, if the modular inverse of the generator α divides p − 1, then it is possible to break the system. As an example, the choice of
as a generator, is not recommended. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries which will be utilized in the sequel. Our contribution, mainly composed by Algorithm 2 and Corollary 3, is presented in section 3. We conclude in section 4.
Throughout this article, we will adopt ElGamal paper notations [4] . Z, N are respectively the sets of integers and non-negative integers. For every positive integer n, we denote by Z n the finite ring of modular integers and by Z * n the multiplicative group of its invertible elements. Let a, b, c be three integers. The great common divisor of a and b is denoted by gcd(a, b). We write a ≡ b [c] if c divides the difference a − b, and a = b mod c if a is the remainder in the division of b by c. The positive integer a is said to be B-smooth [8, p.92] , B ∈ N, if every prime factor of a is less than or equal to the bound B.
We start, in the next section, by preliminaries containing known mathematical facts that will be exploited later.
Preliminaries
Before exploring new situations under which one can forge ElGamal digital signature, we briefly review three questions that are directly related to our result.
Discrete logarithm problem when p − 1 is B-smooth
The discrete logarithm problem importance started to grow with the publication in 1976 of the fundamental work of Diffie and Hellman [3, 11] . The issue became central in public key cryptography. Let p be a prime integer and α a primitive root of Z * n . We consider the discrete logarithm equation
where y is fixed in {1, 2, 3, . . . , p − 1}, and x is unknown in {0, 1, 2, . . . , p − 2}. In 1978, Pohlig and Hellman [12] published a practical method to solve equation (1) when all the prime factors of p−1 are not too large. Let us recall the outlines of their algorithm.
Assume that p − 1 is B-smooth. The bound B depends on the computers power. This implies that we can obtain the prime factorization of p − 1 :
We will first find x modulo p n i i for every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and apply the Chinese Remainder Theorem [8, p.68 ] to compute x modulo p
can be written as :
and therefore
From equation (3) we obtain the first coefficient
We get the second coefficient b 1 from equation (4) . Gradually, we compute b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n 1 −1 and then determine x 1 . This is computationally possible since 2 n 1 ≤ p − 1 and then n 1 ≤ ln(p − 1) ln 2 . In other word, n 1 is bounded by the bit length of p − 1. We repeat the technique with p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p k and arrive to the following system of congruences :
Hence, system (5) can efficiently be solved by the Chinese Remainder Theorem method whose running time is
ElGamal signature algorithm
We recall the basic ElGamal protocol [4, 19, 8] in three steps.
1.
Alice begins by choosing three numbers p, α and x such that :
-p is a large prime integer.
-α is a primitive root of the finite multiplicative group Z * p . -x is a random element taken in {1, 2, . . . , p − 2}.
She computes y = α x mod p and publishes the triplet (p, α, y) as her public key. She keeps secret the parameter x as her private key.
2. Suppose that Alice desires to sign the message m < p. She must solve the modular equation
where r and s are two unknown variables.
Alice computes r = α k mod p, where k is selected randomly and is invertible modulo p−1.
She has exactly ϕ(p − 1) possibilities for k, where ϕ is the phi-Euler function. Equation (6) is then equivalent to :
As Alice possesses the secret key x, and as the integer k is invertible modulo p − 1, she computes the second unknown variable s from relation (7) by :
The inverse modulo p − 1 of the integer k in equation (8) is computed by the extended Euclidean algorithm whose complexity is O(ln 2 p) bit operations.
3. Bob can verify the signature by checking that congruence (6) is valid.
Observe that, in step 1., we need to know how to construct signature keys. Generally, the running time for generating prime integers takes the most important part in the total running time. In [6] , we made experimental tests and concluded by suggesting some rapid procedures. In step 2., the random integer k must be kept secret, otherwise relation (7) allows any adversary to obtain Alice private key x. The fact of having many possibilities for the valid pairs (r, s) does not affect the system security. Indeed, these pairs are uniformly distributed [18] .
To prevent obvious attacks against ElGamal signature scheme, some of theme mentioned in the original paper [4] , it is necessary to work with a free collision hash function h. The message M is simply replaced by m = h(M) before applying the signature algorithm. We can take h equal to the secure hash algorithm SHA1 [19. p139, 8. chap9 ].
Bleichenbacher's attack
In Eurocrypt'96 meeting, Bleichenbacher indicated a possible weakness in the ElGamal signature scheme if the keys are not properly chosen [2, 1] . His ideas are summarized in his main theorem.
Theorem 1.[2]
This theorem has the immediate consequence :
If α is B-smooth and divides p − 1, then it is possible to generate a valid ElGamal signature on an arbitrary value h.
Now, we can move to the next section where we expose our contribution.
Our contribution
In this section, we present our main result. The first sufficient condition for forging ElGamal signature is based on a slight simplification of Bleichenbacher's theorem. More precisely, we have :
Theorem 2. Let (p, α, y) be Alice public key in an ElGamal signature scheme. If an adversary can compute a nonnegative integer k ≤ p − 2, relatively prime to p − 1 and such
is B-smooth, then he will be able to forge Alice signature.
Proof. We follow the method used in [2] . Let (p, α, y) 
can be solved in polynomial time. Hence there exists
To forge Alice signature for a message M, and a hash function h, if the adversary puts 
So (r, s) is a valid signature for the message M, obtained without knowing Alice secret key.
If the first valid exponent k in our Theorem 2 is not too large, the adversary can construct the following deterministic algorithm in order to forge ElGamal signature. Consequently, we recommend that when selecting the signature keys, we have to verify that for any k ≤ K 0 , where gcd(k, p − 1) = 1 and K 0 is the largest bound allowed by computer power,
has at least one large prime factor.
Algorithm 1
Input : Alice public key (p, α, y) and the message M to be signed.
Output :
The signature (r, s) of M.
1. Read(p, α, y); {(p, α, y) is Alice public key}.
Read(M); m:=h(M)
; {m is the hashed of the message to be signed}.
3. j ← −1; {Initialization of integers j which play the role of exponents k}. 4. F ← 0; {F is a flag}.
5.
While (F=0) do 5.1. j ← j + 2; {j must be invertible modulo p − 1, so j is odd}.
5.2.
If gcd(p − 1, j) = 1 then 5.2.1. r ← α j mod p; { r will be the first parameter of the signature}. − 1, r) ; { D will be the exponent in equation (9)}.
D ← gcd(p

If (p − 1)/D is B-smooth, then
5.2.3.1 k ← j; { k is the searched exponent of α}.
F ← 1;
{ To stop the while loop}. 6. x 0 ← X; {X is a solution of equation (9), obtained by Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [12] }.
; {s is the second parameter of the signature}.
8. Return(r, s); {(r, s) is the digital signature}.
Our theorem 2 has a first remarkable consequence : if Q denotes the part of the prime factorization of p − 1 that is not B-smooth and if α k mod p, for some k ∈ N, is a multiple of Q then ElGamal signature scheme is insecure. More formally : Proof. Observe, first, that α is not necessary a divisor of p − 1, nor a B-smooth integer. Since α k mod p is a multiple of Q, we have Q divides gcd(p−1, α k mod p). So p
, and then p − 1 gcd (p − 1, α k mod p) is B-smooth. We conclude by applying Theorem 2.
If the first valid exponent k is not too large, Corollary 2 leads to a more practical algorithm for forging ElGamal signature.
Algorithm 2
Input : Alice public key (p, α, y) and the message M to be signed. Output : The signature (r, s) of M.
Read(M); m:=h(M)
3. Q 0 ← Q; {Q is the part of p − 1 that is not B-smoot}. 4. j ← −1; {Initialization of integers j which play the role of exponents k}.
5. F ← 0; {F is a flag}. 6. While (F=0) do 6.1. j ← j + 2; {j must be invertible modulo p − 1, so j is odd}.
6.2.
If gcd(p − 1, j) = 1; then 6.2.1. r ← α j mod p; { r will be the first parameter of the signature}.
6.2.2.
If r mod Q 0 = 0 then 6.2.2.1. k ← j; { k is the searched exponent of α}.
6.2.2.2. F ← 1; { To stop the while loop}. 7. D ← gcd(p − 1, r); { D will be the exponent in equation (9)}. 8. x 0 ← X; {X is a solution of equation (9), obtained by Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [12] }.
10. Return(r, s); {(r, s) is the digital signature}.
Next result, which can be seen as an extension of Blechenbacher's Corollary 1, shows that in an ElGamal signature scheme, it is not secure to have a primitive root whose modular inverse divides p − 1. In particular, as a primitive root, α = p + 1 2 is not recommended since its inverse is 2. More explicitly : Proof. a) Put p − 1 = α Q. As α is a primitive root, we have
= α which is smooth and this allows the use of our theorem 2. 
c) If p ≡ 1 [4] , then the affirmation is true from case a). Assume then that p ≡ 3 [4] and put p = 3 + 4K, K ∈ N * . As α is a primitive root, we have α (p−1)/2 ≡ −1 [p], and then
is B-smooth which allows us to apply theorem 2 and achieve the proof.
Before concluding, we give the following theoretical theorem relative to the number of exponents k figuring in Corollary 2 and Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3. Let α be a primitive root of the multiplicative group Z * p . For any fixed integer Q such that 1 ≤ Q ≤ p − 1, if we set E α = {k ∈ N / 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 2, gcd(p − 1, k) = 1, and Q divides α k mod p} (11) then the cardinality of E α is independent of the choice of the primitive root α.
Proof. Let α, β be two fixed primitive roots of Z * p . It is well-known that there exists i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p − 2} such that gcd(p − 1, i) = 1 and α ≡ β i [p] . Consider then the function :
f : E α −→ E β k → ik mod (p − 1) First we have f (k) ∈ E β , where E β is defined like E α in relation (13) . Indeed gcd(p − 1, ik mod (p − 1)) = gcd(p − 1, ik) = 1 since gcd(p − 1, k) = gcd(p − 1, i) = 1. On the other hand β ik mod (p−1) ≡ β ik ≡ α k [p], so Q divides β ik mod (p−1) mod p and therefore ik mod (p − 1) ∈ E β . Let us now establish that f is an injective function. We have successively :
since i is invertible modulo p − 1. As 1 ≤ k, k ′ ≤ p − 2, we obtain that k = k ′ . Since f is injective Card(E α ) ≤ Card(E β ) and by interchanging the role of the parameters α and β, we find that Card(E β ) ≤ Card(E α ) and so Card(E α ) = Card(E β ). This means that Card(E α ) is a constant depending only of the two integers p and Q.
Conclusion
In this paper, we described new conditions on parameters selection that can lead to an efficient deterministic algorithm for forging ElGamal digital signature. Our approach is based on the work of Bleichenbacher presented at Eurocrypt'96 conference [2] .
